By
Michelle Maiese
Tova Norlen
Heidi Burgess
Original Publication: October, 2003 by Maiese and Norlen, updated in September 2020 by Heidi Burgess
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What is Polarization?
Polarization is the process that causes neutral parties to take sides in a conflict. It also causes individuals on either side of the conflict to take increasingly extreme positions that are more and more opposed to each other. As parties move toward these opposite "poles," they define themselves in terms of their opposition to a common enemy. Trust and respect diminish, and "distorted perceptions and simplified stereotypes emerge."[1] Parties assume more rigid positions and may refuse to negotiate.
The study of polarization first came to be identified with those realist writers who wrote about the structure of the international system, the impact of military alliances on war and peace, and the balance of power. Writers such as Vasquez, Choucri North, Wallace and Bueno de Mesquita wrote about the effect of polarization on the incidence, severity, and magnitude of great wars and arms races.[2] Polarization also became the main element in the study of the security dilemma, a situation in which parties feel threatened by an "enemy," so they increase their arms, which causes the other side to feel threatened, therefore increasing their own arms. The dilemma is that attempts to bring more security actually bring less. Increased pre-emptive militarization combines with fear, misperceptions, and negative stereotypes to encourage polarization. While polarization can occur in any type of conflict, it has it most damaging effects in large-scale inter-group, public policy, and international conflicts.
Causes of Polarization
Polarization is caused by a number of related psychological, sociological, and political processes. It is closely tied up with escalation in a bi-directional relationship. In other words, escalation causes polarization and vice versa.
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As conflict escalates, the emergence of enemy images and stereotypes damages the relationship between adversaries. Important lines of communication and interaction that are normal to peaceful relationships are cut off, and trust diminishes. As parties begin to attribute their grievances to the other side, they often reduce the number of non-conflictual relations and interactions that they have with that party. Adversaries tend to become increasingly isolated from each other, and any inter-group communication is channeled through more antagonistic lenses. Because parties have fewer ties to individuals from the other group, they may feel freer to employ more severe actions against that group.[3] Group isolation and polarization is further aggravated by the tendency of partisans to try to win bystanders to their side, forcing people to take sides. As more people are drawn into the conflict, that conflict intensifies.
| "Leadership is imperative in the polarization and escalation process because group members must be convinced that their grievances can be attributed to the adversary or 'Other.' Followers must also be convinced that the desired change is possible through the particular course of action suggested by their leadership." -- Lou Kriesberg |
Conversely, escalation seems to increase polarization. Formerly neutral parties are pulled to one side or the other and fewer community members can retain their moderate positions. In part, this is because those involved in the conflict demand that neutral non-participants decide whether they are "with us or against us."[4] Those who would normally urge moderation and attempt to mediate the conflict are recruited by participants in the controversy, and forced to take sides. It is difficult for community members to remain neutral when people are fighting, damaging each other's property, and injuring each other. In such situations, there is a tendency to cast blame and to side with one party or the other.
Radical positions are further reinforced by group homogeneity and cohesiveness. Kriesberg notes that adversaries with little internal diversity are more prone to escalation.[5] They are more prone to polarization as well. This is because homogeneity makes it less likely that a group will consider alternatives to the severe tactics being advocated or employed by extremists. As parties assume more radical positions, group members tend to reinforce each other's negative stereotypes and enemy images.[6] Any moderate positions go unheard or their proponents ostracized -- or worse -- as they are seen as traitors to the cause. As this process continues, parties are often further segregated, and their relationship with outsiders becomes increasingly hostile and competitive.[7]
While some scholars of intergroup conflict regard polarization and escalation as inevitable in interethnic relationships, others see it as the result of social mobilization or manipulation by political elites. Leadership whose legitimacy is threatened, either by the leaders' own actions or by an immediate crisis, can use identity as a 'rallying cry' by calling for mobilization and collective action along nationalistic or ethnic lines.[8] In order to foster homogeneity and build support for their cause, such leaders may portray the adversary as a grave threat to the vital interests and identity of "their people."[9] This furthers both polarization and escalation simultaneously.
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Addressing Polarization
Polarization is so much a part of the process of escalation that it is difficult to ascertain if one is the cause of the other. Ikle writes that as soon as two adversaries have initiated violence, their stakes and expectations change, making it impossible to return to a peacetime relationship without first repairing the damage.[10] Escalation has multiple dimensions; it could be a shift or change in the pattern of the violence, but Ikle notes that it also usually prolongs the war by default.
Parties engaged in conflict typically focus on their differences, which can result in pushing the parties toward polar opposite positions. Strategies that encourage parties to consider their common interests can help to mitigate such effects. Planning and pursuing joint projects, for example, can help parties to focus on commonalities rather than contentious issues. Because fear and distrust often play a central in producing polarization, trust building strategies are also beneficial. The establishment of personal relationships between adversaries can help to improve their communication, increase their level of mutual understanding, and make them less likely to view each other as evil enemies. Better understanding of a party's true motives can help to reduce anger and hostility and eliminate actions that unwittingly threaten or annoy one's opponent.[11]
If possible, third-party mediators or consultants should help parties to better understand the dynamics of their conflict and to address their negative perceptions and attitudes. This sort of transformative mediation can enhance trust and help parties to refrain from taking hostile actions.[12] If parties can move toward productive negotiation, they have taken the first step towards reconciliation.
Current Implications
The current implications for this essay are quite obvious, particularly if one has been reading the news since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. His election was a reflection of the already deep polarization of American politics, and his demeanor, behavior and policies have significantly deepened that polarization since he took office. Consider, for example, the article by Thomas Carothers, reporting on Trump's response to the Coronavirus:
The coronavirus arrived in the United States at an apex of political polarization: the final phase of the impeachment process against President Donald Trump, which capped years of growing partisan acrimony between Democratic and Republican politicians, as well as deepening divisions in the larger society. Some observers wondered if a national public health emergency might jolt the two clashing camps into setting party politics aside and tackling the challenge together—echoing perhaps the experience of World War II, which helped depolarize U.S. politics for decades afterward.
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His response to the coronavirus has been one more elaboration of a by now well-rehearsed strategy of governing through polarizing attacks on opponents and treating every major policy challenge almost solely in terms of how it affects his reelection chances. Eschewing any unifying language about the suffering that COVID-19 has inflicted on hundreds of thousands of Americans, Trump has built his coronavirus narrative around his favored partisan targets. He has attacked the media, which he blames for exaggerating the crisis to harm his reelection campaign; foreigners (in particular China); scientific expertise, including that of “deep state” professionals within his own administration; and multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization. [13]
As this excerpt suggests, although Trump's response to COVID-19 worsened polarization, it was already bad to start with. If you read through the original text of this essay, you'll see many familiar descriptions:
- Parties form stereotypes and enemy images of "the other"
- Lines of communication between the parties are cut off
- Trust diminishes
- Each side blames the other for its problems
- The parties begin to employ harsher and harsher tactics against the other side.
- Formerly neutral parties are pulled to one side or the other as partisans insist everyone "take a side."
- Radical positions are further reinforced by group homogeneity and cohesiveness.
- Relationships with outsiders becomes increasingly hostile and competitive.
This certainly sounds like the relationship between the two major political parties in the United States today! I was particularly struck by the last paragraph in the original essay in the "Causes of Polarization" section:
While some scholars of intergroup conflict regard polarization and escalation as inevitable in interethnic relationships, others see it as the result of social mobilization or manipulation by political elites. Leadership whose legitimacy is threatened, either by the leaders' own actions or by an immediate crisis, can use identity as a 'rallying cry' by calling for mobilization and collective action along nationalistic or ethnic lines.[8] In order to foster homogeneity and build support for their cause, such leaders may portray the adversary as a grave threat to the vital interests and identity of "their people."[9] This furthers both polarization and escalation simultaneously.
Most of the original article was written about conflicts between nations, not within nations, which became more apparent in the section on addressing polarization, where the discussion largely assumed a violent confrontation between contenders. But several of the observations Maiese and Norlen made still apply to the U.S. case:
- Strategies that encourage parties to consider their common interests can help to mitigate [polarization].
- Because fear and distrust often play a central in producing polarization, trust building strategies are also beneficial.
- The establishment of personal relationships between adversaries can help to improve their communication, increase their level of mutual understanding, and make them less likely to view each other as evil enemies.
- Better understanding of a party's true motives can help to reduce anger and hostility and eliminate actions that unwittingly threaten or annoy one's opponent.
The key to doing any of that, however, is to somehow establish personal relationships between adversaries, to get people to actually sit down and listen to one and other. This is extremely difficult to do in a time when we aren't even supposed to sit down face to face with our own family members (because of COVID), but at the same time, we are all on ZOOM conversations now more than ever. So might this be a time to facilitate more zoom conversations across political divides?
This is, obviously, also a crisis that calls out for the use of mass communication technologies to help larger numbers of people to start more quickly spanning the divide. Journalists, writers, and anyone else who has an audience that is interested in their views on our hyper-polarized politics can try to focus their reporting on helping defuse the situation, rather than doing things that further drive polarization. And, we can all spend less time paying attention to materials that paint the opposing side in the most unflattering way possible and seek out materials that help us really understand what we are all doing to intensify the polarization spiral and what we might be able to do now, and in the future, to change things.
--Heidi Burgess, Sept. 5, 2020
[1] Dean Pruitt and Paul Olczak, "Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving Seemingly Intractable Conflict," 59-92, in Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice: Essays Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch, eds. Barbara Bunker and Jeffrey Rubin, et al. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, Inc., 1995), 81.
[2] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Phaltzgraff, Contending Theorys of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 5th edition. (Longman Publishers, 2001), 297.
[3] Kriesberg, 159.
[4] Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 96. New edition <http://scar.gmu.edu/book/social-conflict-escalation-stalemate-and-settlement>.
[5] Kriesberg, 159.
[6] Kriesberg, 159.
[7] Pruitt and Olczak, 81.
[8] Donald Rothchild and Chandra Lekha Sriram, "Third Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict Prevention," in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester. ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
[9] Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 1998), 159. New version of this book (2012) <http://books.google.com/books?id=qhuwiOmaVDIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
[10] Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964).
[11] Pruitt and Olczak, 77.
[12] Pruitt and Olczak, 82.
[13] Thomas Carothers "The United States: Presidential Leadership, Polarization, and the Coronavirus." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 28, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/united-states-presidential-leadership-polarization-and-coronavirus-pub-81643
Use the following to cite this article:
Maiese, Michelle, Tova Norlen, and Heidi Burgess "Polarization." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/polarization>.
